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COMPUTER-AIDED ADVOCACY
Stuart S. Nagel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In many ways, computers have become an almost indispensable
tool for lawyers. Nearly seventy percent of all law offices in the United
States now have at least one word processing or data processing terminal.1 More importantly, the increasingly popular personal computer, or
"PC," can now be used to aid appellate practitioners in determining
what to advocate on appeal in order to increase the probability of victory for their clients. Such computer usage by appellate advocates has
been termed computer-aided advocacy (CAA). It is a substantially
higher level of computer usage than litigation support, 2 which usually
refers to a system of information retrieval for handling litigation matters that involve many separate items. CAA should also be distinguished from document drafting software, which incorporates decisions
on what to advocate in a legal brief by drawing upon a data bank of
related arguments.
The principles underlying CAA are a legal variation on computeraided manufacturing (CAM) 3 and computer-aided design (CAD), 4
both of which are becoming extremely important to the American
economy. The most appropriate software for CAA is software which
enables an individual to process: (1) the set of criteria which the decision makers might have for reaching the decision; (2) the alternative
positions the decision makers might take regarding the overall issue or
sub-issues in the case; and (3) the relationship between each alternative
and each criterion-in other words, how conducive or adverse each al* Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; Member of the Illinois Bar. Professor
Nagel has been an attorney to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, the National Labor
Relations Board, and the Legal Services Corporation. He is a graduate of the Northwestern University Law School as of 1958, followed by a Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern in
1961.
1. Keeffe, How to Shop for Your Firm's Computer, A.B.A. J., May 1984, at 161.
2. For information concerning possible uses of computers in the courtroom, see Bailey, How
to Alleviate the Glut of Lawsuits, USA Today, July 9, 1988, at 32.
3. For information on the growing use and diversity of computer-aided manufacturing, see
generally Almodovar, Manufacturing Simulators Save Time, Provide Data for Layout Evaluation, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, June 1988, at 28; Haider & Banks, Simulation Software Products for Analyzing ManufacturingSystems. INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, July 1986, at 98.
4. See Shirland, Acceptable Sampling Plan Design with Risks for Producers and Consumers, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, June 1987, at 27; New Software, GRAPHIC ARTS MONTHLY, Oct.
1988, at DS30; Scitex America, GRAPHIC ARTS MONTHLY, July 1988, at 80.

Published by eCommons, 1988

165

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:1

ternative is to each criterion.' An example of such software is Policy/
Goal Percentaging (P/G %) software.'
This article analyzes San Antonio v. Rodriguez,7 Dandridge v.
Williams,' and McCleskey v. Georgia,9 in brief form using P/G%
software. The various case analyses which follow demonstrate that
there are numerous benefits for those who choose to brief their cases
with P/G% software. First, such a briefing technique allows one to
think more explicitly about the alternatives that are available to the
court, rather than simply working with what the court has defined as
the adopt-reject decision. Second, using P/G% software to brief cases
also allows one to analyze more clearly the goals that might be
achieved by whatever decision is reached.-Third, the P/G% briefing
technique helps advocates recognize that consistency with prior case
law, as a goal, is generally not enough to explain court decisions, especially decisions on new and complex issues. Fourth, briefing cases with
P/G% software provides the advocate with a quantitative framework
for determining which alternative to emphasize to the court in order to
increase the client's probability of victory on appeal.

II.
A.

THREE CASE ANALYSES UTILIZING

P/G% SOFTWARE

San Antonio v. Rodriguez:' 0 Aid for Low-Income Schools

1. The Inputs to a Spreadsheet Brief
Table 1 provides an example of a spreadsheet brief of the Rodriguez decision. This landmark case allowed the United States Supreme
Court to consider the extent to which a state may be required to help
equalize expenditures per student across school districts within a
state. " The Rodriguez Court held that the system for financing public
schools in Texas-a system whereby each district supplemented state

For information dealing with traditional legal prediction, see generally H. JONES, J. KERA. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD (1980); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION; DECIDING APPEALS (1960); W. STATSKY & J. WERNET, CASE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING (1977); E. THODE, L. LEBOWITZ & L. MAZOR, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF LAW (1970).
6. For useful background material on P/G% software in the context of both prediction and
prescription, see S. NAGEL, PUBLIC POLICY: GOALS, MEANS, AND METHODS 343-54 (1984); Nagel,
Using Microcomputers and P/G% to Predict Court Cases, 18 AKRON L. REV. 541 (1985); Nagel,
Part/Whole Percentagingin Policy/Program Evaluation, 8 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLANNING
107 (1985).
7. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
8. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
9. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (interim ed. 1987).
10. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
11. For an in depth discussion of the issues and background of the Rodriguez case, see
Clune, Wealth Discriminationin School Finance, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 651 (1973); Coons, Introduchttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/11
tion: "'FiscalNeutrality" After Rodriguez, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299 (1974).
5.

NOCHAN &
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TABLE 1
APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN RODRIGUEZ
A.

THE ALTERNATIVES AND THE CRITERIA

1
2
3
4

Alternatives
NO EQUALITY
EQUAL S
MIN. $
HIGH $

1
2
3
4

B. SCORING
EDUC.POP. -DISCON. -DOWNGR.
NO EQUALITY
1.00
1.00
3.00
EQUAL $
2.00
2.00
1.00
MIN. $
2.00
2.00
2.00
HIGH $
3.00
3.00
2.00

Outcome
YES
NO
NO
NO

I
2
3
4
5
6

C.

1
2
3
4

Criteria
EDUC. POP.
- DISCON.
- DOWNGR.
ADM. EASE
CONS.
- EXP.

Meas. Unit
1-3 SCALE

ADM.EASE
3.00
1.00
f.00
1.00

EDUC. POP.
DISCON.
- DOWNGR.
ADM. EASE
CONS.
- EXP.
-
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-1.50.
-1.50
0.50
0.50
-0.50
0.50

-EXP.
3.00
2.00
1.50
1.00

Outcome
YES
NO
NO
NO

D. THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
NO EQUALITY
MIN. $
1
2
3
4
5
6

CONS.
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00

TOTAL SCORES
Combined
Raw Scores
13.00
10.00
10.50
11.00

NO EQUALITY
EQUAL $
MIN. $
HIGH $

Weight
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

4.50
4.50
4.50
3.50
4.50
4.00

Weight
3.500
3.500
-1.500
-0.250
-0.667
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aid through local property taxes-bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose and, thus, did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 This type of brief could be prepared after the case had been decided in order to plan a future strategy
for advocacy on similar issues. The brief could also be prepared while
the case was still in progress in order to highlight those ideas which the
advocate should emphasize in his or her presentation to the court.
Table IA of the brief shows that the Supreme Court was faced
with four alternatives in Rodriguez: (1) no equality of expenditure per
student required; (2) equal expenditure per student required; (3) a
minimum amount of expenditure per student required, but otherwise
allowing for inequality; or (4) a requirement of equality in expenditure
per student with the amount of the expenditure set at a high level. The
first part of the spreadsheet brief indicates that the Court approved of
the first alternative, but rejected the others.
The right side of Table IA shows that there were probably six
criteria which the Rodriguez Court considered in reaching its ,decision
(1) having an educated population; (2) decreasing discontent due to
educational disparities; (3) avoiding the downgrading of affluent
schools; (4) administrative ease; (5) consistency with prior cases; and
(6) avoiding heavy taxpayer expense.
Table lB of the brief shows how the different alternatives scored
on each criterion using a simple 1 to 3 scale, where a score of 3 means
"conducive to the goal," a score of 2 means "neither conducive nor
adverse to the goal," and a score of 1 means "adverse to the goal."
Table 1C of the brief shows the combined raw scores for each alternative. The alternative with the highest combined raw score is no equality
required-the alternative which the Supreme Court ultimately
adopted.
2.

Converting a Loser into a Winner

Table 1D of the brief presents what is known as a "threshold analysis." This type of analysis indicates what it would take to bring the
second-place alternative up to first place. There was a gap of 2.50
points between the first-place and second-place alternatives on the combined raw scores. That gap would be eliminated if the no equality required alternative were to drop by 2.50 points on any of the six criteria.
However, that would clearly be too large a drop for any one criterion
alone, since these criteria cannot go below 1.00. The gap could also be
eliminated if the second-place alternative of having a minimum number
of dollars per student were to increase by 2.50 points on any of the six
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/11
12.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54-55.
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criteria. Again, though, that would be too large an increase for any one
criterion, since these criteria cannot go above 3.00. The gap could also
be eliminated if the Supreme Court were to attach greater weight to.
the criterion of having an educated population or the criterion of decreasing discontent due to educational inequalities. Those are the two
areas which the advocates of a minimum-dollars alternative should emphasize. Furthermore, the gap could be eliminated if some of the aforementioned criteria were given negative weights, but such a weighting
would be unlikely, given the nature of the criteria in Rodriguez. Also,
as Table 1D indicates, changing the weights of the different criteria
would not help with regard to consistency with prior cases, since both
first and second-place alternatives score the same on that criterion.
One of the most useful products of CAA is information such as
that contained in Table 1D. The threshold analysis presented in Table
1D forces the appellate advocate to consider how the relative weights of
the criteria or goals would have to change in order to turn the secondplace alternative into a winner. Undertaking such an analysis is crucial
to increasing the advocate's probability of success, because the relative
importance of the criteria is much more open to change through convincing advocacy than the relationship between the alternatives and the
criteria themselves.
It should be noted that although the high dollars per student alternative came in second place in the initial analysis shown in Table 1C, it
did not do as well when compared with the -no equality required alternative in the threshold analysis, because the high dollars per student
alternative fares so poorly on the criterion of avoiding extra expense. In
other words, the third-place alternative does better on the threshold
analysis than the second-place alternative because the third-place alternative has the economic feasibility which the second-place alternative
lacks. It also has the political feasibility which may be lacking in the
alternative of equal dollars per student.13
B.

Dandridge v. Williams:'

Aid for Large but Poor Families

1. Background on the Dandridge Case
In 1970 the Legal Services Program

5

suffered a severe setback

13. For further details concerning the Rodriguez case and aid to low-income schools, see
generally C. CAMPBELL, THE REFORM OF EDUCATIONAL FINANCE: A SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1981); S. CARROLL & R. PARK, THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE
(1983); J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970).
14. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
15. For further information about the Legal Services Program and the volunteer system for
Published
by eCommons, 1988
providing legal services for the poor, see generally J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & H.
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when it lost the Dandridge case. In Dandridge, the United States Supreme Court held that a Maryland maximum grant regulation-which
placed an absolute limit of $250.00 per month on the amount of grants
under AFDC regardless of the size of the family and its actual
need-did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.1 6 The Rodriguez case and the Dandridge case, together,
represented a turning point in the Court's decisions with respect to poverty law. The Court had previously decided a number of important decisions in favor of the Legal Services Program.1 7 The turnaround in the
Supreme Court's decisions in 1973 is often attributed to changes in the
complexion of the Court, especially Chief Justice Burger's replacement
of Chief Justice Warren. However, there may be other explanations for
the Court's turnaround. Perhaps the cases that were brought by the
Legal Services Program in the late 1960s were easier to win than the
cases that were brought in the 1970s. Another possibility is that the
Legal Services Program may have become overly confident and a bit
sloppy by the 1970s, and lost the Rodriguez and Dandridge cases
merely as a result of poor appellate advocacy.
The Rodriguez case has already been discussed with respect to
how advocating the alternative of a minimum expenditure of dollars
per student might have been a more effective strategy than advocating
strict equality of expenditure per student. The Dandridge case involved
a related failure to present an acceptable alternative to the Supreme
Court and, again, the result was a total defeat for the position set forth
by the Legal Services Program.
2.

Inputs to the Dandridge Case

Table 2A shows the three alternative positions that could have
been argued by counsel for the Legal Services Program in the Dandridge case.18 In actuality, counsel for the Legal Services Program argued that if the family allowance for three children was approximately
$300.00 per month, then the allowance for four children should be

ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS

D.

(1978); D.

ROSENTHAL,

R.

KAGAN &

QUATRONE, VOLUNTEER ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: NEW YORK'S CLO

(1971); Abel, Law Without Politics:Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA
L. REV. 474 (1985); Maher & Turza, Is Mandatory Pro Bono a Good Idea?, 8 B. LEADER 18
(1983).
16. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486.
17. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
18. For literature concerning the Dandridge case and aid to large but poor families, see
generally A. LAFRANCE, LAW OF THE POOR (1973); LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE POOR: CASES AND
MATERIALS (A. Berney ed. 1975); PROBLEMS IN THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR:
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/11
CASES AND MATERIALS (E. Jarmel ed. 1972).
PROGRAM
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TABLE 2
APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN DANDRIDGE
A.

THE ALTERNATIVES AND THE CRITERIA

Alternatives
I MAX. GRANT
2 PROP. GRANT
3 DIM. RET.

Outcome
YES
NO
-PRESENT

I MAX. GRANT
2 PROP. GRANT
3 DIM. RET.

-TAX BURD.
5.00
1.00
3.00

I
2
3
4
5

B.

C.

ECO. SCALE
1.00
1.00
5.00

Weight
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

ADM. EASE
3.00
3.00
2.00

TOTAL SCORES
Combined
Raw Scores
14.00
12.00
16.00

D.

-TAX BURD.
MIN. FOOD
CONS.
ECO. SCALE
ADM. EASE

Meas. Unit
1-5 SCALE

SCORING

MIN. FOOD CONS.
1.00
4.00
5.00
2.00
3.00
3.00

I MAX. GRANT
2 PROP. GRANT
3 DIM. RET.

I
2
3
4
5

Criteria
-TAX BURD.
MIN. FOOD
CONS.
ECO. SCALE
ADM. EASE

Outcome
YES
NO
-PRESENT

THRESHOLD ANALYSIS

MAX. GRANT

DIM. RET.

Weight

7.00
3.00
6.00
3.00
5.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
3.00
0.00

2.000
0.000
3.000
0.500
3.000
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$400.00 per month, the allowance for five children should be $500.00
per month, and so on, with a $100.00 increase for each additional
child.1 9 The State of Maryland, however, maintained that there should
be a maximum grant of approximately $300.00 per family, regardless
of the actual number of children in the family." The Legal Services
Program attacked Maryland's position as a blatant denial of equal protection, because while the third child in the family would get $100.00
per month for support, the fourth child would get nothing. 1 The State
of Maryland countered by asserting that as the number of children in
family grew the average award to each child was merely reduced. 2
Thus, with three children each received $100.00 of support, and with
four children each received $75.00 of support.2 So, according to the
State of Maryland, the fourth child was receiving $75.00 per month in
24
support, rather than nothing.
Unfortunately, the position which was never argued was that the
increment should go down with each successive child-given economies
of larger-scale operation-but not down to zero. Counsel for the Legal
Services Program contended that the amount of the award should not
go down at all. The State of Maryland maintained that the award
should, in effect, go down to nothing. A seemingly logical alternative
position would be that if a family with three children receives $300.00,
then a family with four children should receive about $350.00. This
alternative recognizes that if the children average $100.00 apiece in a
three-child family, then the children should average less than $100.00
apiece in a four-child family. The figure of $350.00 means that the
children will be averaging $87.50 apiece, an amount which is between
the $100.00 asked for by the Legal Services Program and the $75.00
asked for by the State of Maryland.
The second part of Table 2A shows some of the criteria that were
explicitly or implicitly considered by the Supreme Court in Dandridge:
(1) minimizing the taxpayer burden; (2) providing at least a minimum
amount of food, shelter, and clothing to dependent children; (3) preserving consistency with past cases; (4) recognizing economies of scale;
and (5) minimizing the burden on public administrators.
Table 2B shows how each of the three alternatives scores on the
aforementioned criteria based on a 1 to 5 scale, where a score of 5
means that the alternative is "highly conducive" to the criterion, a

19. Brief for Appellee at 9, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (No. 131).
20. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 477.
21. Brief for Appellee at 47, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (No. 131).
22. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 477.
23. See id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/11
24. See id.
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score of 4 means "mildly conducive," a score of 3 means "neither conducive nor adverse," a score of 2 means "mildly adverse," and a score
of 1 means "highly adverse." On the criterion of minimizing taxpayer
burden, the maximum grant alternative is clearly the best, and the proportionate grant alternative is the worst. On providing minimum food,
shelter, and clothing to dependent children, the situation is reversed
with the proportionate grant alternative scoring the highest, and the
maximum grant alternative scoring the lowest. When considering consistency with prior cases, the differences are not as great among the
three alternatives, but the maximum grant alternative is probably more
consistent with prior cases than the proportionate grant alternative. It
would seem that the Supreme Court tends to consider the equal protection clause satisfied by minimally constitutional positions, rather than
requiring optimum positions. With regard to the economies of scale criterion, the diminishing returns grant alternative does well, whereas the
other two alternatives are clearly adverse to the criterion. On the criterion of minimizing the administrative burden, both the maximum grant
alternative and the proportionate grant alternative score equally well.
3. Results of the Dandridge Case
Table 2C presents the overall scores for each alternative. This table indicates that when it comes to a contest between the maximum
grant alternative and the proportionate grant alternative, the maximum
grant alternative is likely to be the winner-which it was in Dandridge.
What is more interesting, though, is the fact that the diminishing returns grant alternative receives more points than either of the other two
alternatives. Not only is the diminishing returns grant alternative the
winner in a three-way contest, but it is also a clear winner over the
maximum grant alternative which the Supreme Court ultimately
adopted in the two-way contest in Dandridge.
Yet, the size of the victory by the diminishing returns grant alternative should not be measured solely by the number of points received.
It must also be measured by observing what it would take to bring the
maximum grant alternative up to the level of the diminishing returns
grant alternative. As the threshold analysis in Table 2D demonstrates,
in order for the maximum grant alternative to be the overall winner,
one would have to assign virtually no weight to the criterion of providing minimum food to dependent children or one would have to completely discount the economies of scale criterion. Table 2D also shows
that the maximum grant alternative could be the winner if it were
given unreasonably high scores on the five criteria, such as giving it a
score of 7 on minimizing the taxpayer burden. One could also give unreasonably low scores to the diminishing returns grant alternative in
Published
by eCommons,
order to
make the 1988
maximum grant alternative the winner. Or, one
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could make the maximum grant alternative the winner if an unreasonably heavy weight was assigned to the criterion of minimizing the taxpayer burden, relative to providing minimum food needs and economies
of scale. However, such weightings and scorings would seem highly
unlikely.
Thus, a CAA analysis of the Dandridge case indicates that the
Legal Services Program could have turned a dismal failure into a substantial success. Under CAA a successful outcome would have been
more likely in the Dandridge case, because the Legal Services Program
could have clearly identified the alternatives that were available to advocate and determined how those alternatives might score on the various criteria that the Supreme Court would be likely to consider. Not
only did losing the Dandridge case mean establishing a bad precedent
for calculating benefit levels in all public aid programs, but it also
tended to demoralize appellate advocacy at the Legal Services Program. It may have had an unreasonably adverse effect on the willingness to bring future test cases before the Supreme Court on the mistaken theory that the Court was not receptive to reason.
C. McCleskey v. Georgia:25 Racial Discriminationand Capital Punishment
1. Alternatives, Criteria, and Relations
The utility of CAA can be further illustrated by developing a
spreadsheet analysis of the McCleskey case. In McCleskey, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and murder.26 McCleskey's conviction stemmed from a 1978 furniture store robbery and the resulting
death of a white police officer;2 7 the defendant was black.2 8 The trial
court, accepting the jury's recommendation, sentenced McCleskey to
death on the murder charge.2 9 After exhausting the traditional appeals
process, McCleskey filed a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district
court charging that "the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory manner," in violation of the defendant's eighth and fourteenth amendment rights."
In support of his habeas corpus claim, McCleskey had offered statistical evidence to the district court which purported to show a gross
disparity in sentencing defendants to death in Georgia based upon the

25. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (interim ed. 1987).
26. Id. at 1762.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1763.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/11
30. Id.
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TABLE 3
APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN MCCLESKEY
A.
Alternatives
I ALLOW DISC.C.P.
2 DISALL.DISCR.C.P.
3 DISALL. C.P.

1 ALLOW DISC.C.P.
2 DISALL.DISC.C.P.
3 DISALL. C.P.

THE ALTERNATIVES AND THE CRITERIA
Outcome
YES
-PRESENT
NO

-HOMIC.
3.50
3.00
2.50

D.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

-HOMIC.
SEP. INNOC.
-DEL. & COST
RAC. EQUAL.
PUB. OPIN.
PRED.
-OV. PREC.

-HOMIC.
SEP. INNOC.
-DEL. & COST
RAC. EQUAL.
PUB. OPIN.
PRED.
-OV. PREC.

Published by eCommons, 1988

Meas. Unit
1-5 SCALE

TOTAL SCORES
Combined
Raw Scores
15.00
26.00
21.50

Weight
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Outcome
YES
-PRESENT
NO

THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
ALLOW
DISC. C.P.
10.00
8.50
8.50
7.50
8.50
8.50
9.00

E.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Criteria
-HOMIC.
SEP. INNOC.
-DEL. & COST
RAC. EQUAL.
PUB. OPIN.
PRED.
-OV.PREC.

B. SCORING
SEP. -DEL. &
RAC. PUB.
-OV.
INNOC. COSTS EQUAL. OPIN. PRED. PREC.
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.00
5.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
C.

1 ALLOW DISC. C.P.
2 DISALL. DISC. C.P.
3 DISALL. C.P.

I
2
3
4
5
6
7

DISALL.
C.P.
-4.00
-2.50
-2.50
-2.50
-4.50
-3.50
-4.50

Weight
7.500
-2.250
-2.250
-1.167
-5.500
14.000

ALLOW
DISC. C.P.
14.50
13.00
13.00
12.00
13.00
13.00
13.50

Weight
23.000
-10.000
-10.000
-1.750
-4.500
-4.500
-6.333

THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
DISALL.
DISC. C.P.
-8.00
-8.00
-8.00
-6.00
-7.00
-7.00
-7.00
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race of the victim, and to a lesser degree, on the race of the defendant. 31 The raw numbers presented to the trial court indicated that 11 %
of the defendants convicted of killing white persons received the death
penalty, while only 1 % of the defendants. whose victim was black were
sentenced to death.3 '
Following an extensive evidentiary hearing, the district court
found that the methodology utilized in arriving at the data that McCleskey presented to the court was flawed and, because of the defects
in the evidence presented, the defendant's petition should be dismissed. " In affirming the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit held that, even assuming the validity of the
proffered testimony, the statistics were "insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent or unconstitutional discrimination in the Fourteenth
Amendment context, [and] insufficient to show irrationality, arbitrariness and capriciousness under any kind of Eighth Amendment analysis."" The United States Supreme Court affirmed.36
The alternative positions available to the Court in McCleskey are
evidenced in Table 3A. The McCleskey Court adopted a position that
would allow capital punishment sentences to stand even where a pattern of racial discrimination might be shown. The position taken by the
ACLU, the NAACP, and other groups opposed to capital punishment,
was that evidence of racial discrimination should be a cogent justification for abolishing capital punishment. Juxtaposed between the two
foregoing alternatives is a position not advocated in McCleskey, but
one that should be considered. This middle position would preclude
capital punishment in those states where a discriminatory pattern is
evidenced that exceeds an acceptable threshold.
The discriminatory threshold under the middle position could be
exceeded in a particular state if the percentage of blacks who receive
the death penalty in that state is more than 20% higher than the percentage of whites sentenced to death. For example, if a state has sentenced 50 % of the blacks convicted of capital offenses to die, but less
than 30% of the whites convicted of similar offenses have received the
death penalty, the acceptable threshold would be exceeded.
The percentage threshold would obviously be that percentage
which the Supreme Court finds to be beyond acceptable limits. While a
10% disparity might not be considered to exceed the threshold, perhaps a disproportion of 30% would exceed the threshold. The signifi-
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cant idea, though, is that there should be some critical difference between the percentage of blacks sentenced to death and similarly
situated whites in the sample state, in order for the Court to find that
the difference is excessive. However, it should be noted that the data to
be compared would not be the percentage of blacks sentenced to death
as opposed to the percentage of whites who receive the death penalty;
instead, the data to be compared would be the percentage of defendants whose victims were white and the percentage of those whose victims were black. 86
The data presented in McCleskey indicated that a substantial discriminatory pattern was evident in Georgia's sentencing practice based
37
upon the race of the victim as opposed to the race of the defendant.
However, the Supreme Court rejected the significance of this data, and
found that McCleskey's claim "could apply with equally logical force
to statistical disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the criminal justice system . ..."938
If the Supreme Court were to adopt a threshold approach, the
remedy to cure the disparity in death sentencing among the races
would probably have to be left to the discretion of the state whose sentencing practices were found to exceed the permissible threshold. Until
remedial action was taken to cure the disparity in sentencing, the implementation of capital punishment in the offending state would be suspended. The remedy for the disproportion in sentencing might include
commuting the death sentences of some black defendants to life imprisonment in order to decrease the percentage of blacks sentenced to
death. In theory, the remedy might also include increasing the percentage of whites who receive the death penalty. However, increasing the
number of white defendants who are sentenced to death could not be
accomplished with defendants who have already been sentenced, since
resentencing would obviously constitute double jeopardy. 9 Redistributing the percentages could be accomplished by implementing the remedy with white defendants who have not been sentenced. Yet, alleviating the disparity by increasing the number of whites sentenced to
death, would result in more capital sentences, not less, and, thus, would
probably be an undesirable alternative to those who are opposed to capital punishment in its entirety and, in all probability, to the sentencing
authorities in the state involved.
The criteria which the McCleskey Court may have considered in
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reaching its decision are presented in Table 3A. These criteria include
the following: (1) reducing homicides; (2) separating the innocent from
the guilty; (3) reducing delay and court costs; (4) promoting racial
equality; (5) satisfying public opinion; (6) encouraging predictability;
and (7) avoiding overly broad precedents.
Table 3B reflects how each of the alternatives in McCleskey scores
in relation to the stated criteria. For example, permitting capital punishment-even where evidence of discrimination is present-might be
considered as a viable means of reducing homicides, although not to a
great degree, whereas a complete ban on capital punishment would
have the opposite effect. On the other hand, condoning capital punishment tends to interfere with separating the innocent from the guilty,
because innocent defendants are more likely to be convicted in capital
cases where there is no victim to testify. Moreover, such a conviction
would obviously be irretrievable if implemented. Precluding capital
punishment helps reduce the delay and exorbitant expense of the
lengthy appeals process, which is exacerbated by capital sentencing.
With regard to promoting racial equality, a conditional disallowance would promote greater racial equality than a total ban on capital
sentencing. It would also score relatively high on promoting predictability in the sentencing process, especially predictability based on the law
and the facts, without regard to the race of the defendant or the victim.
Limiting the implementation of conditional disallowance to those states
with gross discriminatory patterns would also promote the practice of
discouraging overly broad precedents. The scoring indicates that public
opinion would probably be opposed to both extreme alternatives; that
is, there would inevitably be strong opposition to either permitting discriminatory capital punishment or enforcing a total ban on capital punishment. However, public opinion might favor the conditional disallowance alternative.
2.

The Overall Scores and the Sensitivity Analysis

Considering the overall scores, the conditional disallowance alternative seems to be the optimal alternative. The query then becomes
why was it not adopted in McCleskey? The simple answer is that it
was not presented to the Court. Interestingly, the overall scores also
indicate that the total disallowance alternative scores higher than the
alternative of continuing capital punishment with racially discriminatory patterns. Why was the alternative that scored the lowest adopted
by the Court? The answer might be that the Court did not choose to
weigh all of the criteria equally.
Table 3D demonstrates that the alternative of allowing discriminatory capital punishment will prevail over total disallowance if the Court
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/11
gives added weight to the criteria of decreasing homicides and avoiding
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overly broad precedents. Perhaps this was the weight distribution which
the Court actually applied in McCleskey. The justices might have
found that the total disallowance alternative would be unacceptable because of the adverse impact that it would have on the goal of decreasing homicides and because of the broad precedent that would be established by such a holding. If capital punishment were declared
unconstitutional on the theory that it has been administered in a racially discriminatory manner, such a precedent could be utilized to obtain a sweeping declaration that all forms of sentencing are unconstitutional, as well as many other forms of government behavior.
Table 3E tends to reinforce the notion that if the conditional disallowance alternative had been advocated, it would have been accepted
by the Court in McCleskey. The threshold analysis in Table 3E indicates that in order for the Court to decide in favor of allowing discriminatory capital punishment, as opposed to conditional disallowance, it
would either have to give an extremely heavy weight to the criterion of
decreasing homicides or it would have to give a negative weight to criteria such as separating the innocent from the guilty and reducing delays and costs.4 0
III.
A.

GENERAL IDEAS AND CONCLUSIONS

Comparing the Cases

There are a number of concepts that are common to the three
aforementioned case studies. In each of the cases, several alternative
positions were discussed. The first position was a rather liberal one
which-at the time-the Supreme Court was unlikely to adopt: (1) upgrading the quality of poor schools to the level of wealthy school districts; (2) providing for welfare payments at a constant amount per
child regardless of the total number of children in the family; and (3)
completely abolishing capital punishment in the face of the potential
for racial discrimination.
The position at the other extreme of the spectrum was a relatively
conservative alternative which the Supreme Court ultimately adopted:
(1) ruling that states have no obligation to provide for equal expenditures per student among school districts; (2) finding that states are not
required to provide additional welfare funding for larger families; and
40. For further details concerning the McCleskey case and racially discriminatory capital
punishment, see K. HAAS & J. INCIARDI, CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES (1988); W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN ExAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); Baldus, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experiences, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1741 (1987).
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(3) permitting capital punishment regardless of how it might correlate
to racial discrimination.
In each instance there was also a middle-of-the-road position
which might very well have been adopted by the Court if it had been
presented to the Court. These alternatives included: (1) a requirement
that states upgrade schools to at least a minimum level of funding; (2)
a finding that dependent families should receive incremental increases
in aid, as the number of children in the family increases, based upon a
theory of diminishing returns; and (3) a ruling that capital punishment
should be suspended in those states where the racial disparity has surpassed an acceptable threshold until the disparity is reduced below the
threshold.
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez,-" the middle position might have
prevailed if it had been advocated, and if the Supreme Court had
placed greater importance on the value of having an educated population and reducing the popular discontent which results from a dearth of
educational opportunities. Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams," the
middle alternative could have been accepted by the Court if it had been
advocated; objectively, this position would appear to be more tenable
than the conservative position that was ultimately adopted by the
Court, and it would not require the Court to sway from its accepted
value judgment. Finally, in McCleskey v. Georgia4 3 the middle approach appears to be more tenable than either of the other two alternatives, yet it was never advocated before the Court.
B.

Is Half a Loaf Better than None?

On an extreme level of generality, one cannot overlook the fact
that pursuing the middle alternatives suggested above is rather
unambitious. Worse than unambitious, it might be argued that in some
situations, the middle alternative is almost worthless. For example,
when one is dealing with a situation that involves an S-shaped take-off
curve, nothing is achieved until a level above the take-off point is
reached. By way of illustration, a lawyer who works one, two, or even
three hours in crafting an appellate brief may be just as ineffective as a
lawyer who works four or five hours on the brief, when the nature of
the case requires between six and ten hours of work in order to prepare
an effective brief. In this type of situation, doing anything less than six
hours of work on the brief is equivalent to doing nothing on the brief.
An even less appealing situation is one where the lawyer expends a
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minimal amount of time on the case, but still prevails by a narrow
margin. Here, the lawyer may experience feelings of satisfaction and
accomplishment even though the case was won by a narrow margin. In
the long run such feelings may prevent the lawyer from pursing the
higher and more appropriate goals that he might have pursued had he
not prevailed in the first instance. Thus, in these two situations it could
be argued that half a loaf is worse than none.
C. Benefits of Incremental Optimizing
On the other hand, there are a number of arguments which would
seem to suggest that getting a half a loaf is better than getting nothing.
One of the primary arguments in favor of pursuing half a loaf is that
eventually the cumulative effort will result in a whole loaf. For example, if half of the total desired achievement is reached in one day, then
on the second day an effectiveness level of 75 % could be achieved by
cutting the remaining 50% in half. On the third day, a level of 87.5%
could be achieved by dividing the remaining 25 %. On the fourth day, a
rate of over 90% could be attained, which should generally be sufficient for all except overachievers.
In other words, just settling for half a loaf may be worse than
none, but, in terms of appellate advocacy, it is reasonable to conclude
that the middling position might be pursued today, the 75% position
pursued tomorrow, and the 87.5 % position next week. In fact, the foregoing analysis is indicative of the constitutional evolution which has
taken place in the United States Supreme Court. The logic behind the
seminal desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education,""did not
evolve in a day. Nor was the principle of providing counsel for indigent
defendants established with a single decision. The right to counsel for
an indigent defendant began with the right to counsel in capital cases, 5
and proceeded through felony cases,"' appellate cases,"' police interrogation,18 misdemeanor cases, 4' and the next step in the evolutionary
process might very well be civil cases.
Although the incremental process may appear to be slow going at
first glance, in reality it may work faster than reaching for the top at
the very beginning. If a proper foundation had not been laid for the
Brown decision by the persistent chipping away at the more blatant
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forms of racial discrimination and educational segregation, it is quite
possible that appellate advocates might still be trying to convince the
Supreme Court to declare segregated schools unconstitutional.
Moreover, even if one could succeed in going for the "big win" all
at once, the incremental approach might be more desirable because it
allows the opposition, neutral parties, and even the supporters of a particular position to digest the gains in such a way as to facilitate the
implementation of the new position. Each step in the process presents a
learning experience which paves the way for the acceptance of the next
incremental step. The process of evolution in civil liberties has proceeded in the United States through eras that could not have been easily compressed. For example, the Woodrow Wilson era was the first to
tolerate modification of unrestrained capitalist activity. That era saw
the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission and the Pure Food
and Drug Administration, both early forms of middle-class consumer
protection. In the New Deal era of the 1930's, the rights of workers to
unionize without -being subjected to firing was established. In the
1960's the rights of blacks and women were firmly implanted in the
law, a fact that could not have been accomplished without the precedents of workers' rights and consumers' rights. Indeed, the women's
rights movement was built, to a great extent, on the black civil rights
movement.
An important point to be remembered is that an incremental approach does not mean that one has low goals. It can mean that the
party utilizing the approach has very high goals, but seeks to achieve
them through a series of steps, partly in an effort to avoid the risk of
going for the top all at once and winding up with nothing. Far worse is
the thought that such a defeat could be so demoralizing that the affected party does not easily spring back to try again. If a party loses
when pursuing a middling position, he does not lose as much and is
likely to be less demoralized than with total defeat. This concept does
not run contrary to the idea that it is better to set one's goals high and
get halfway there than to set one's goals low and get three-fourths of
the there. Pursuing the middling position in appellate advocacy is
unambitious only if it is all that the party adopting that strategy wants.
D.

Computer-Aided Advocacy and Multiple Alternatives

One point that must be emphasized in the context of this article is
that if middling positions make sense, what value is added by CAA?
Why could the conclusion not be arrived at without decision-aiding
software? The simple answer is that almost anything a computer can
do could probably also be done by an individual without computer assistance if the person wants to work long enough and hard enough. For
example, an individual might undertake the laborious task of finding
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the 128th root of an eighty digit number. Why, though, should anyone
handicap themselves when a useful tool for broadening one's perspective and simulating the behavior of the appellate court is available?
Decision-aiding software that is based on a spreadsheet format and
multi-criteria decision-making such as the software described in this
article encourages the advocate to think in terms of both multiple criteria and multiple alternatives. Otherwise, there is a tendency for an advocate to think in terms of two alternatives,, the plaintiffis position and
the defendant's position, or the liberal position as opposed to the conservative position, instead of three or more alternatives. Likewise, there
is a tendency for the advocate to think in terms of one criterion in
appellate advocacy, namely, consistency with the holdings of prior
cases. However, if one position was so obviously consistent or inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prior holdings, it is unlikely that the
Court would have granted certiorarito hear the case in the first place.
One might also maintain that the demonstration of the software
underlying CAA only looks impressive because the cases analyzed by
the system have already been decided; all that appears from the system
is hindsight in action. However, that argument is rebutted by the fact
that all of the information which is shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 could
have been developed before the cases were decided. While there is no
question that a case can better be analyzed after it has been decided,
that is not to say that a systematic, meaningful analysis cannot be done
before a case is decided. The more that is at stake, the more justification there is for going to the trouble of trying to think of all of the
alternative positions that could be argued, and all of the criteria that
the court might take into consideration in arriving at its decision. CAA
should make it easier for the appellate advocate to determine which
alternatives are available to the court, what criteria the court will use
to evaluate those alternatives, and what correlation between the alternatives and the criteria should be emphasized to the court in order to
increase the client's probability of victory.
In spite of all that has been discussed about the importance of
systematic CAA, it should be noted that appellate advocacy has some
considerable limitations in the kinds of civil liberties cases that were
used in this article as illustrative examples. The greatest limitation is
that there is not much more that the United States Supreme Court can
do with regard to broadening the interpretation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution or other civil liberties. The most blatant
forms of discrimination have already been declared unconstitutional or
statutorily prohibited. The new frontier in the area of civil liberties
may find its focus in congressional and presidential action concerning
subsidies, tax treatment, and other incentives which are designed to

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:1

provide better employment opportunities for blacks, women, the poor,
rural people, and other disadvantaged groups. However, this shift away
from court created rights may simply mean that in the spreadsheet
analysis alternatives should be included which relate to executive and
legislative action, rather than just judicial action.
The spreadsheet format emphasizes multiple alternatives, rather
than dichotomies, and multiple criteria, rather than single objectives or
goals. A multiple approach can be helpful in deciding what alternative
to argue before an appellate court or whether to go to the court or to
the legislature for a remedy. Moreover, a spreadsheet analysis can
prove to be useful in a number of other circumstances where the appellate practitioner is faced with making difficult decisions: (1) when one
must decide whether to go through the federal courts as opposed to the
state courts; (2) when' one must decide among several alternative test
cases; (3) when one must decide whether or not to appeal a decision;
and (4) when one must decide whether to pursue alternative forms of
dispute resolution-which are becoming increasingly popular-such as
computer-aided mediation. Thus, the spreadsheet format of decisionaiding software has many possibilities for the appellate advocate beyond traditional appellate advocacy. The arguments contained in this
article should assist in revealing some of those possibilities which will,
in years to come, help make :appellate advocacy more effective, efficient, and equitable.5 0
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